On cogito propositions

Philosophical Studies 29 (1):63-68 (1976)
Abstract
I argue that George Nakhnikian's analysis of the logic of cogito propositions (roughly, Descartes's 'cogito' and 'sum') is incomplete. The incompleteness is rectified by showing that disjunctions of cogito propositions with contingent, non-cogito propositions satisfy conditions of incorrigibility, self-certifyingness, and pragmatic consistency; hence, they belong to the class of propositions with whose help a complete characterization of cogito propositions is made possible.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00355672
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Kathryn P. Parsons (1970). Mistaking Sensations. Philosophical Review 79 (April):201-213.

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