David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems 2 (1):32-71 (2012)
In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, I argue that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. I also argue that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are semiotic systems. Finally, I suggest that minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers. In doing so, I take issue with Fetzer’s arguments to the contrary.
|Keywords||computationalism semiotic systems cognition syntax semantics|
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Robin K. Hill (2016). What an Algorithm Is. Philosophy and Technology 29 (1):35-59.
Prakash Mondal (2014). Does Computation Reveal Machine Cognition? Biosemiotics 7 (1):97-110.
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