Noûs 19 (2):255-271 (1985)
|Abstract||Terence Parsons's informal theory of intentional objects, their properties, and modes of predication does not adequately reflect ordinary ways of speaking and thinking. Meinongian theories recognizing two modes of predication are defended against Parsons's theory of two kinds of properties. Against Parsons's theory of fictional objects, I argue that no existing entities appear in works of fiction. A formal version of Parsons's theory is presented, and a curious consequence about modes of predication is indicated.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
A. K. Jorgensen (2004). Types of Negation in Logical Reconstructions of Meinong. Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):21-36.
Edward N. Zalta (1992). On Mally's Alleged Heresy: A Reply. History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (1):59-68.
Terence Parsons (1982). Fregean Theories of Fictional Objects. Topoi 1 (1-2):81-87.
Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.
Dale Jacquette (1989). Mally's Heresy and the Logic of Meinong's Object Theory. History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):1-14.
Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Fictional Objects, Non-Existence, and the Principle of Characterization. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):139-146.
Erich Rast (2010). Classical Possibilism and Fictional Objects. In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Fiction in Philosophy.
William J. Rapaport (1991). Meinong, Alexius; I: Meinongian Semantics. In Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology. Philosophia Verlag.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #93,337 of 549,065 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?