Understanding understanding: Syntactic semantics and computational cognition

Philosophical Perspectives 9:49-88 (1995)
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Abstract

John Searle once said: "The Chinese room shows what we knew all along: syntax by itself is not sufficient for semantics. (Does anyone actually deny this point, I mean straight out? Is anyone actually willing to say, straight out, that they think that syntax, in the sense of formal symbols, is really the same as semantic content, in the sense of meanings, thought contents, understanding, etc.?)." I say: "Yes". Stuart C. Shapiro has said: "Does that make any sense? Yes: Everything makes sense. The question is: What sense does it make?" This essay explores what sense it makes to say that syntax by itself is sufficient for semantics.

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William J. Rapaport
State University of New York, Buffalo

Citations of this work

Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing.William J. Rapaport - 2012 - International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems 2 (1):32-71.
The philosophy of computer science.Raymond Turner - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How minds can be computational systems.William J. Rapaport - 1998 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (4):403-419.

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