David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):584-610 (2013)
A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either have to reject the extremely plausible idea that experience is as it seems, or we are forced to provide an account of temporal experience that isn’t compatible with the phenomenology. I conclude by noting that the only plausible interpretation of the slogan is the weak interpretation, and outline a positive account of temporal experience, according to which an appearance of succession requires a succession of appearances.
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References found in this work BETA
William James (1890/1981). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
Barry F. Dainton (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.
Robin Le Poidevin (2007/2009). The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Samuel Baron, John Cusbert, Matt Farr, Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences. Philosophy Compass 10 (8):560-571.
Ian Phillips (2014). Breaking the Silence: Motion Silencing and Experience of Change. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):693-707.
Ian Phillips (2014). Experience of and in Time. Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.
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