Classical Possibilism and Fictional Objects

In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Fiction in Philosophy (2010)
Abstract An account of non-existing objects called 'classical possibilism', according to which objects that don't actually exist do exist in various other ways, is implemented in a two-dimensional modal logic with non-traditional predication theory. This account is very similar to Priest's, but preserves bivalence and does not endorse dialethism. The power of classical possibilism is illustrated by giving some examples that makes use of a description theory of reference. However, the same effect could also be achieved in a more Millian fashion. It is argued that classical possibilism is ontologically more neutral than is commonly thought, because it allows for the formulation of various forms of reductionism within the object language.
Keywords actualism  possibilism  non-existent objects  non-denoting terms  non-traditional predication theory  Sinowjew / Zinovev  fictional objects  Sherlock Holmes  descriptivism  Priest
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