An epistemological problem for evolutionary psychology

This article draws out an epistemological tension implicit in Cosmides and Tooby's conception of evolutionary psychology. Cosmides and Tooby think of the mind as a collection of functionally individuated, domain-specific modules. Although they do not explicitly deny the existence of domain-general processes, it will be shown that their methodology commits them to the assumption that only domain-specific cognitive processes are capable of producing useful outputs. The resultant view limits the scope of biologically possible cognitive accomplishments and these limitations, it will be argued, are such as to deny us epistemic capacities that evolutionary psychology presupposes in its pursuit of an objective, comprehensive account of human nature
Keywords Capacity  Cognitive  Evolutionary Psychology  Model  Science  Cosmides, L  Tooby, J
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Brian Garvey (2011). Darwinism and Environmentalism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69:67-82.
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