David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52 (2006)
This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity to assign mental states to the other. This applies even in those instances where one might seem to adopt a ‘detached’ perspective towards others. Thus ‘folk psychology’, as commonly construed, is not folk psychology
|Keywords||Cognition Epistemology Folk Psychology Interaction Intersubjectivity|
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Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
Jane Suilin Lavelle (2012). Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):213-230.
Monika Dullstein (2012). The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):231-248.
Martin Capstick (2013). On-Line False Belief Understanding Qua Folk Psychology? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):27-40.
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