David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):299 – 322 (2008)
This paper explores the phenomenology of touch and proposes that the structure of touch serves to cast light on the more general way in which we 'find ourselves in a world'. Recent philosophical work on perception tends to emphasize vision. This, I suggest, motivates the imposition of a distinction between externally directed perception of objects and internally directed perception of one's own body. In contrast, the phenomenology of touch involves neither firm boundaries between body and world nor perception of bodily states in isolation from perception of everything else. I begin by arguing that touch does not involve two distinct feelings, a feeling of the body and a feeling of something external to the body. Rather, these are inextricable aspects of the same unitary experience, with one or the other occupying the experiential foreground. Then I suggest that tactile experience does not always respect a clear boundary between body and world. In touch, bodily and worldly aspects are experienced in a number of different ways and, in many instances, there is no clear experiential differentiation between the two. Finally, I draw these two points together in order to consider the contribution made by touch to our sense of being situated in a world.
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References found in this work BETA
Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
David Marr (1982). Vision. Freeman.
Martin Heidegger (1962). Being and Time. London, Scm Press.
David Marr (1982). Vison. W. H. Freeman.
Citations of this work BETA
Havi Carel (2011). Phenomenology and its Application in Medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (1):33-46.
Yochai Ataria (2014). Where Do We End and Where Does the World Begin? The Case of Insight Meditation. Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1128-1146.
Louise Richardson (2013). Bodily Sensation and Tactile Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):134-154.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
Line Ryberg Ingerslev (2013). My Body as an Object: Self-Distance and Social Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):163-178.
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