David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202 (2005)
William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition and affect, James rejects a number of commonplace assumptions concerning the nature of our cognitive relationship with the world, assumptions that many of his critics take for granted
|Keywords||Cognition Emotion Epistemology Intentionality James, William|
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References found in this work BETA
Martha C. Nussbaum (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
Martin Heidegger (1967). Being and Time. Oxford, Blackwell.
Paul E. Griffiths (1997). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. University of Chicago Press.
Martin Heidegger (1962). Being and Time. London, Scm Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michelle Maiese (forthcoming). Thought Insertion as a Disownership Symptom. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
Michelle Maiese (2014). How Can Emotions Be Both Cognitive and Bodily? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.
Larry A. Herzberg (2009). Direction, Causation, and Appraisal Theories of Emotion. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):167 – 186.
Michelle Maiese (2012). Rethinking Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):893-916.
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