David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 39 (4):751-757 (2011)
Aristotelian relativism about the future (as recently defended by MacFarlane ( 2003 )) claims that a prediction made on Monday, such as ‘It will rain’, can be indeterminate on Monday but determinate on Tuesday. A serious objection to this intuitively appealing view is that it cannot coherently be attested: for if it is attested on Monday, then our blindness to what the future holds precludes attesting that the prediction is determinate on Tuesday, and if it is attested on Tuesday (when, suppose, it rains), then the fact that it rains precludes attesting that the prediction is indeterminate on Monday. In this paper, I focus on Moruzzi and Wright ( 2009 )’s recent development of this objection and argue that it fails. This result removes a major obstacle to defending the Aristotelian view
|Keywords||philosophy of time the open future|
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References found in this work BETA
Aristotle (1984). The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton University Press.
John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
John MacFarlane (2008). Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths. In Max KâObel & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press 81--102.
Sebastiano Moruzzi & Crispin Wright (2009). Trumping Assessments and the Aristotelian Future. Synthese 166 (2):309 - 331.
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