Is Lewis's Mixed Theory Mixed Up?

Theoria 79 (1):57-75 (2013)
Abstract
My aim is to rekindle interest in David Lewis's (1983) infamous but neglected Mixed Theory of mental states. The Mixed Theory is a mix of physicalism and functionalism designed to capture the intuitions that both Martians and abnormal human Madmen can be in pain. The Mixed Theory is widely derided. But I offer a new development of the Mixed Theory immune to its most prominent objections. In doing so, I uncover a new motivation for the Mixed Theory: its unique ability to explain cases in which it is plausibly indeterminate whether something is in pain. The Mixed Theory, whether or not it is ultimately correct, at least deserves renewed attention
Keywords physicalism  David Lewis  functionalism
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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