David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 155 (1):23-35 (2011)
Impostors are pseudo-problems masquerading as genuine problems. Impostors should be exposed. The problem of change appears genuine. But some, such as Hofweber ( 2009 ) and Rychter ( 2009 ), have recently denounced it as an impostor. They allege that it is mysterious how to answer the meta - problem of saying what problem it is: for even if any problem is genuinely about change per se, they argue, it is either empirical or trivially dissolved by conceptual analysis. There is indeed an impostor in our midst. But it is the meta-problem of change. I defend the appearance that the problem of change is a genuine metaphysical problem about change. This vindicates philosophers’ lasting interest in it. It also illuminates what makes a problem metaphysical, how metaphysics relates to other inquiries, and how best to respond to attempts to undermine metaphysical problems.
|Keywords||Change Metaphysics Time|
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References found in this work BETA
Rene Descartes (2004). Meditations on First Philosophy. Caravan Books.
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.
Stephen R. Schiffer (2003). The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press.
A. N. Prior (2003). Papers on Time and Tense. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Iris Einheuser (2012). Is There a (Meta-)Problem of Change? Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):344-351.
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