David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Jc Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press (2003)
Here is an account of logical consequence inspired by Bolzano and Tarski. Logical validity is a property of arguments. An argument is a pair of a set of interpreted sentences (the premises) and an interpreted sentence (the conclusion). Whether an argument is logically valid depends only on its logical form. The logical form of an argument is fixed by the syntax of its constituent sentences, the meanings of their logical constituents and the syntactic differences between their non-logical constituents, treated as variables. A constituent of a sentence is logical just if it is formal in meaning, in the sense roughly that its application is invariant under permutations of individuals.1 Thus ‘=’ is a logical constant because no permutation maps two individuals to one or one to two; ‘∈’ is not a logical constant because some permutations interchange the null set and its singleton. Truth functions, the usual quantifiers and bound variables also count as logical constants. An argument is logically valid if and only if the conclusion is true under every assignment of semantic values to variables (including all non-logical expressions) under which all its premises are true. A sentence is logically true if and only if the argument with no premises of which it is the conclusion is logically valid, that is, if and only if the sentence is true under every assignment of semantic values to variables. An interpretation assigns values to all variables.
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Timothy Williamson (2013). Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality. Erkenntnis (S2):1-21.
Andrew Bacon (2013). Non-Classical Metatheory for Non-Classical Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):335-355.
Timothy Williamson (2006). Indicative Versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):310–333.
Salvatore Florio (2014). Unrestricted Quantification. Philosophy Compass 9 (7):441-454.
Agustín Rayo (2007). Plurals. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):411–427.
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