A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):289 - 295 (2010)
I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are well-defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048401003746009
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,865
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Roger White (2009). Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence. In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press 161-186.
James M. Joyce (2005). How Probabilities Reflect Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153–178.
Mark Kaplan (1983). Decision Theory as Philosophy. Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
Isaac Levi (1974). On Indeterminate Probabilities. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

44 ( #75,700 of 1,724,879 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #210,931 of 1,724,879 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.