A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):289 - 295 (2010)
Abstract
I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are well-defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White
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    References found in this work BETA
    James M. Joyce (2005). How Probabilities Reflect Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153–178.
    Mark Kaplan (1983). Decision Theory as Philosophy. Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
    Scott Sturgeon (2010). Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes. In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 3--126.

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