Cognition: Unobservable information processing or private social practice?

Abstract
This paper presents a critique of cognitive psychology's micro-process program, as well as suggestions for a more scientifically and pragmatically viable approach to cognition. The paper proceeds in the following sequence. First, the mainstream point of view of contemporary cognitive psychology regarding cognitive micro-processes is summarized. Second, this view is criticized. Third and finally, cognitive science's neuropsychology program is discussed, not with respect to the considerable value of its findings, but with respect to the interpretation that would appropriately be placed on them. Throughout this discussion, an alternative position is advanced--namely, that cognitive processes are best viewed, on both scientific and pragmatic grounds, as private or mental versions of well-understood human social practices 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords cognitive psychology   neuropsychology   cognitive processes   social practices   information processing   cognition
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