David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
After briefly summarizing Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, I consider difficulties that arise for his account from the possibility of an ‘empty HOT’, a HOT that occurs in the absence of the mental state that it purports to represent. I criticize Rosenthal’s responses to this objection, and conclude that the difficulties that derive from the possibility of such misrepresentation are fatal to his HOT-theory.
|Keywords||HOT Rosenthal Consciousness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Berit Brogaard (2012). Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves? Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
Dan Lloyd (1987). Mental Representation From the Bottom Up. Synthese 70 (January):23-78.
Jonah Wilberg (2010). Consciousness and False HOTs. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):617-638.
Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.
Caleb Liang & Timothy Lane (2009). Higher-Order Thought and Pathological Self: The Case of Somatoparaphrenia. Analysis 69 (4):661-668.
Rocco J. Gennaro (1993). Brute Experience and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Papers 22 (1):51-69.
David M. Rosenthal (2003). Unity of Consciousness and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #25,622 of 1,102,075 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #128,850 of 1,102,075 )
How can I increase my downloads?