|Abstract||After briefly summarizing Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, I consider difficulties that arise for his account from the possibility of an ‘empty HOT’, a HOT that occurs in the absence of the mental state that it purports to represent. I criticize Rosenthal’s responses to this objection, and conclude that the difficulties that derive from the possibility of such misrepresentation are fatal to his HOT-theory.|
|Keywords||HOT Rosenthal Consciousness|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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