Polarity and Inseparability: The Foundation of the Apodictic Portion of Aristotle's Modal Logic

History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (3):193-218 (2011)
Modern logicians have sought to unlock the modal secrets of Aristotle's Syllogistic by assuming a version of essentialism and treating it as a primitive within the semantics. These attempts ultimately distort Aristotle's ontology. None of these approaches make full use of tests found throughout Aristotle's corpus and ancient Greek philosophy. I base a system on Aristotle's tests for things that can never combine (polarity) and things that can never separate (inseparability). The resulting system not only reproduces Aristotle's recorded results for the apodictic syllogistic in the Prior Analytics but it also generates rather than assumes Aristotle's distinctions among 'necessary', 'essential' and 'accidental'. By developing a system around tests that are in Aristotle and basic to ancient Greek philosophy, the system is linked to a history of practices, providing a platform for future work on the origins of logic
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/01445341003619896
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,280
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
D. Raymond (2014). Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic. History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (2):209-211.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

39 ( #121,806 of 1,932,541 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #333,140 of 1,932,541 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.