David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 36 (2):219 - 244 (1992)
According to Nancy Cartwright, a causal law holds just when a certain probabilistic condition obtains in all test situations which in turn satisfy a set of background conditions. These background conditions are shown to be inconsistent and, on separate account, logically incoherent. I offer a corrective reformulation which also incorporates a strategy for problems like Hesslow's thrombosis case. I also show that Cartwright's recent argument for modifying the condition to appeal to singular causes fails.Proposed modifications of the theory's probabilistic condition to handle effects with extreme probabilities (0 or 1) are found unsatisfactory. I propose a unified solution which also handles extreme causes. Undefined conditional probabilities give rise to three good, but non-equivalent, ways of formulating the theory. Various formulations appear in the literature. I give arguments to eliminate all but one candidate. Finally, I argue for a crucial new condition clause, and show how to extend the results beyond a simple probabilistic framework.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Richard Otte (1985). Probabilistic Causality and Simpson's Paradox. Philosophy of Science 52 (1):110-125.
Ellery Eells (1987). Probabilistic Causality: Reply to John Dupré. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):105-114.
Joseph F. Hanna (1982). Probabilistic Explanation and Probabilistic Causality. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:181 - 193.
William Roche (2012). A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.
Jon Williamson (2009). Probabilistic Theories of Causality. In Helen Beebee, Peter Menzies & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press. 185--212.
Ellery Eells & Elliott Sober (1983). Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity. Philosophy of Science 50 (1):35-57.
Huw Price (1991). Agency and Probabilistic Causality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):157-176.
Charles R. Twardy & Kevin B. Korb (2004). A Criterion of Probabilistic Causation. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):241-262.
Ellery Eells (1987). Cartwright and Otte on Simpson's Paradox. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):233-243.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #136,658 of 1,410,123 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #75,884 of 1,410,123 )
How can I increase my downloads?