Tye's criticism of the knowledge argument
Dialogue 34 (4):713-26 (1995)
| Abstract | A defense of Frank Jackson's knowledge argument from an objection raised by Michael Tye (1986, 1989), according to which Mary acquires no new factual knowledge when she first sees red but, instead, merely comes to know old facts (that she already knew) in a new way. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Brain Metaphysics Mind Physicalism | |||||||||
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