Tye's criticism of the knowledge argument

Dialogue 34 (4):713-26 (1995)
A defense of Frank Jackson's knowledge argument from an objection raised by Michael Tye , according to which Mary acquires no new factual knowledge when she first sees red but, instead, merely comes to know old facts in a new way
Keywords Brain  Metaphysics  Mind  Physicalism
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300011070
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Paul Raymont (1999). The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):113-26.
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