David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Advancing an account of responsibility which is based on the functioning of our rational capacities, the paper revisits some central aspects of the moral luck puzzle. It proposes a new variant of Williams’ agent-regret, but concludes that its scope does not coincide with cases of moral luck. It then distinguishes different ways in which the factors beyond our control feature in our engagement with the world which show how the guidance principle (we are responsible for actions guided by our rational powers) recognises a narrower range of situations of moral luck than is often supposed, allowing to distinguish between responsibility for intentions, (some) attempts and actions, as well as for responsibility for thoughts and emotions. Finally, relying on the fact that for each person some actions are within his or her range of secure competence the paper argues that responsibility extends beyond the guidance principle. It concludes with a brief outline discussion of the relations between responsibility and blame.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Dana K. Nelkin (forthcoming). Moral Luck. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peter Vallentyne (2006). Hurley on Justice and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):433 - 438.
Christopher Michaelson (2008). Moral Luck and Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4):773 - 787.
Re'em Segev (2008). Responsibility and Moral Luck: Comments on Benjamin Zipursky, 'Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck'. Theoretical Inquiries in Law Forum 9 (1):39-46.
Joseph Raz (2010). Being in the World. Ratio 23 (4):433-452.
Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Morality, Moral Luck, and Responsibility: Fortune's Web. Palgrave Macmillan.
M. Almeida & M. Bernstein (2003). Lucky Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):93-119.
David Sanford Horner (2010). Moral Luck and Computer Ethics: Gauguin in Cyberspace. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 12 (4):299-312.
Neil Levy (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Will Barrett (2006). Luck and Decision. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):73–87.
Added to index2009-10-15
Total downloads89 ( #11,195 of 1,089,063 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #42,757 of 1,089,063 )
How can I increase my downloads?