From Normativity to Responsibility

OUP Oxford (2011)
Abstract
What are our duties or rights? How should we act? What are we responsible for? How do we determine the answers to these questions? Joseph Raz examines and explains the philosophical issues underlying these everyday quandaries. He explores the nature of normativity--namely, the fact that we believe and feel we should behave in certain ways, the reasoning behind certain beliefs and emotions, and various basic features of making decisions about what to do. He goes on to consider when we are responsible for our actions and omissions, and offers a novel account of responsibility. We can think of responsibility for unjustified actions or attitudes as a precondition of the blameworthiness of a person for an attitude or an action, or perhaps for a whole set of actions, intentions, or beliefs. Responsibility for justified actions or attitudes may be a precondition of praiseworthiness. Either way responsibility may point to further consequences of being justified or unjustified, rational or not. But crucially, responsibility attaches to people in a more holistic way. Some people are responsible for their actions, while others are not. In this way, Raz argues that the end is in the beginning, in understanding how people are subject to normativity, namely how it is that there are reasons addressed to them, and what is the meaning of that for our being in the world.
Keywords Liability (Law  Normativity (Ethics  Law Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $43.51 new (21% off)   $47.64 used (14% off)   $49.50 direct from Amazon (10% off)    Amazon page
Call number K230.R38.xA3-xA39 (arrange for t
ISBN(s) 9780199693818   0199693811
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,399
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
George Letsas (2014). The DNA of Conventions. Law and Philosophy 33 (5):535-571.
Similar books and articles
Joseph Raz (2010). Responsibility and the Negligence Standard. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (1):1-18.
Joseph Raz (2010). Responsibility and the Negligence Standard. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (1):1-18.
David Enoch (2011). Reason-Giving and the Law. In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Pink (2007). Normativity and Reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):406-431.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-04-15

Total downloads

10 ( #148,640 of 1,102,936 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #183,209 of 1,102,936 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.