Reasons : Explanatory and normative
In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan (2009)
| Abstract | A thesis familiar by being as often disputed as defended has it that intentional action is action for a reason. The present paper contributes to the defence of a weaker version of it, namely: Acting with an intention or a purpose is acting (as things appear to one) for a reason. | |||||||||
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Maria Alvarez (2009). Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason. Inquiry 52 (3):293-305.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
James Morauta (2010). In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
David Velleman (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Pamela Hieronymi (2011). Reasons for Action. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.
Stephen Darwall (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
Paul K. Moser (1990). Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Ruth Macklin (1968). Norm and Law in the Theory of Action. Inquiry 11 (1-4):400 – 409.
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