Reasons : Practical and adaptive

In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press (2009)
Abstract
The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).
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Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Eric Vogelstein (2012). Subjective Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.
Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2).
Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
Ulrike Heuer (2010). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.

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