Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of Performative Utterances

Cambridge University Press (1987)
Abstract
Professor Recanati's book is a major new contribution to the philosophy of language. Its point of departure is a refutation of two views central to the work of speech-act theorists such as Austin & Searle: that speech acts are essentially conventional, & that the force of an utterance can be made fully explicit at the level of sentence-meaning & is in principle a matter of linguistic decoding. The author argues that no utterance can be fully understood simply in terms of its linguistic meaning, but that only a contextual inference can provide an adequate framework. In pursuit of this argument, he deals with the major issues of pragmatics & speech-act theory: conversational implicatives & indirect speech acts, the classification of illocutionary forces, the performative/constative distinction, delocutivity, locutionary meaning, non-literal uses of languages, the principle of expressibilty, & the difference between institutional & communicative illocutionary acts.
Keywords Meaning (Philosophy  Semantics (Philosophy  Performative (Philosophy  Pragmatics  Convention (Philosophy
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Call number B840.R3713 1987
ISBN(s) 0521303532
DOI 10.2307/2185308
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