General-elimination harmony and the meaning of the logical constants

Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):557-76 (2010)
Inferentialism claims that expressions are meaningful by virtue of rules governing their use. In particular, logical expressions are autonomous if given meaning by their introduction-rules, rules specifying the grounds for assertion of propositions containing them. If the elimination-rules do no more, and no less, than is justified by the introduction-rules, the rules satisfy what Prawitz, following Lorenzen, called an inversion principle. This connection between rules leads to a general form of elimination-rule, and when the rules have this form, they may be said to exhibit “general-elimination” harmony. Ge-harmony ensures that the meaning of a logical expression is clearly visible in its I-rule, and that the I- and E-rules are coherent, in encapsulating the same meaning. However, it does not ensure that the resulting logical system is normalizable, nor that it satisfies the conservative extension property, nor that it is consistent. Thus harmony should not be identified with any of these notions.
Keywords Harmony  Inferentialism  Autonomy  Validity  Tonk  Dummett  Gentzen  Prawitz  Lorenzen
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,660
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Florian Steinberger (2011). What Harmony Could and Could Not Be. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):617 - 639.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

189 ( #19,725 of 1,938,821 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #84,040 of 1,938,821 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.