Hylomorphism reconditioned

Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):341-358 (2011)
Abstract
My goal in this paper is to provide characterizations of matter, form and constituency in a way that avoids what I take to be the three main drawbacks of other hylomorphic theories: (i) commitment to the universal-particular distinction; (ii) commitment to a primitive or problematic notion of inherence or constituency; (iii) inability to identify viable candidates for matter and form in nature, or to characterize them in terms of primitives widely regarded to be intelligible
Keywords hylomorphism  aristotle  matter  form  constituent ontology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,750
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Kit Fine (2008). Coincidence and Form. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):101-118.

View all 25 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Mohan Matthen (2001). Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle's Cosmology. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 20:171-199.
Christopher Frey (2007). Organic Unity and the Matter of Man. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (summer):167-204.
Ernan McMullin (1963). The Concept of Matter. Notre Dame, Ind.]University of Notre Dame Press.
Catherine Jack Deavel (2003). Unity and Primary Substance for Aristotle. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 77:159-172.
Jeffrey E. Brower (2011). Matter, Form, and Individuation. In Brian Davies & Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas. Oxford University Press.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-12-29

Total downloads

37 ( #45,520 of 1,098,879 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #19,005 of 1,098,879 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.