In defence of sceptical theism: a reply to Almeida and Oppy

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241-251 (2005)
Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: ?If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason?. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this journal) that Michael Bergmann's way of developing the sceptical theist response to such arguments fails because it commits those who endorse it to a sort of scepticism that undermines ordinary moral practice. In this paper, we defend Bergmann's sceptical theist response against this charge
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DOI 10.1080/00048400500111147
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Justin P. McBrayer (2010). Skeptical Theism. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.

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