Presentism and fatalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):511 – 524 (2006)
Abstract
It is widely believed that presentism is compatible with both a libertarian view of human freedom and an unrestricted principle of bivalence. I argue that, in fact, presentists must choose between bivalence and libertarianism: if presentism is true, then either the future is open or no one is free in the way that libertarians understand freedom.
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    Robert Adams (1977). ``Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):109-117.
    Robert Merrihew Adams (1986). Time and Thisness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):315-329.
    John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.

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