David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 11 (3):316–328 (1998)
In this paper, I present an Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution. The problem of material constitution arises whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share all of the same parts and yet are essentially related to their parts in different ways. (A familiar example: A lump of bronze constitutes a statue of Athena. The lump and the statue share all of the same parts, but it appears that the lump can, whereas the statue cannot, survive radical rearrangements of those parts.) I argue that if we are prepared to follow Aristotle in making a distinction between numerical sameness and identity, we can solve the problem of material constitution without recourse to co-location or contingent identity and without repudiating any of the familiar objects of common sense (such as lumps and statues) or denying that these objects have the essential properties we ordinarily think that they have.
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael C. Rea (2011). Hylomorphism Reconditioned. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):341-358.
Ross Inman (2014). Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):583-597.
Mark Moyer (2006). Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence? Synthese 148 (2):401 - 423.
Mark Moyer (2008). A Survival Guide to Fission. Philosophical Studies 141 (3):299 - 322.
Mark Moyer (2008). Why We Shouldn't Swallow Worm Slices: A Case Study in Semantic Accommodation. Noûs 42 (1):109–138.
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