Graduate studies at Western
Mind 109 (433):67-79 (2000)
|Abstract||The correspondence theory of truth has experienced something of a revival recently in the form of the Truthmaker Axiom: whatever is true, something makes it true. We consider various postulates which have been proposed to characterize truthmaking, in particular, the Disjunction Thesis (DT), that whatever makes a disjunction true must make one or other disjunct true. In conjunction with certain other assumptions, DT leads to triviality. We show that there are elaborations of truthmaking on which DT holds (which must therefore take steps to avoid the triviality); but that there are more plausible accounts of truthmaking on which DT fails.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter Schulte (2011). Truthmakers: A Tale of Two Explanatory Projects. Synthese 181 (3):413-431.
Dan López de Sa (2009). Disjunctions, Conjunctions, and Their Truthmakers. Mind 118 (470):417-425.
Mark Jago (2009). The Conjunction and Disjunction Theses. Mind 118 (470):411-415.
Jamin Asay (2011). Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005). Why Truthmakers. In H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford University Press.
Ingvar Johansson (2004). Truthmaking: A Cognition-Independent Internal Relation with Heterogeneous Relata. In Johann Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
David Liggins (2005). Truthmakers and Explanation. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2009). The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses. Mind 118 (470):427-443.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads41 ( #32,749 of 739,788 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,288 of 739,788 )
How can I increase my downloads?