Literal Meaning

Cambridge University Press (2004)
Abstract
According to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents (such as truth-conditions) to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' (as opposed to merely implied) determined by linguistic conventions, or is it an aspect of 'speaker's meaning'? Do we need pragmatics to fix truth-conditions? What is 'literal meaning'? To what extent is semantic composition a creative process? How pervasive is context-sensitivity? Recanati provides an original and insightful defence of 'contextualism', and offers an informed survey of the spectrum of positions held by linguists and philosophers working at the semantics/pragmatics interface
Keywords Semantics  Semantics (Philosophy  Pragmatics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $25.94 new (22% off)   $26.02 used (22% off)   $94.00 direct from Amazon    Amazon page
Call number P325.R344 2004
ISBN(s) 0521537363   0521792460   9780521537360
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Avner Baz (2009). Who Knows? European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.
    Agustin Vicente (2012). On Travis Cases. Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (1):3-19.

    View all 62 citations

    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-05-13

    Total downloads

    5 ( #178,845 of 1,089,054 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #30,944 of 1,089,054 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.