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- Francois Recanati (2000). Opacity and the Attitudes. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine.
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Some attitudes typically take whole persons as their objects. Shame, contempt, disgust and admiration have this feature, as do many tokens of love and hate. Objectors complain that these ‘globalist attitudes’ can never fit their targets and thus can never be all-things-considered appropriate. Those who dismiss all globalist attitudes in this way are misguided. The fittingness objection depends on an inaccurate view of the person-assessments at the heart of the globalist attitudes. Once we understand the nature of globalist attitudes and we recognize that we may legitimately treat some traits as more important than others in our overall evaluation of persons, we ought to conclude that our globalist attitudes can, in some cases, fit their targets and should not be summarily dismissed as unfitting. Our relationships contour the fittingness-conditions of globalist attitudes. This relational element poses a problem for fitting-attitude theories of value.
In this paper we relate the board's attributes to the firm's opacity as measured by the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. We find that larger boards and outside directors are associated with reduced opacity, especially in freestanding firms. However, directors' excess control is associated with a significant increase in firm's opacity. We also find that the presence of family pyramidal holding defuses any potential monitoring benefits of board attributes. Our findings suggest that the firm's ultimate ownership structure is not neutral in determining the monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors. This might help explain existing mixed evidence on the monitoring role of the board of directors.
Hedge funds are targets of mounting ethical criticism. The most salient focuses on their opacity. Hedge funds are structured to block transparency for strategic reasons: that is, they systematically deny information to their own investors and to governments in order to protect their competitive advantage, even though the information they hide holds tremendous significance for the interests of both groups. In this article I will detail the ethical allegations made against hedge funds, showing why their opacity creates intractable conflicts that cannot be resolved through government regulation. Sometimes opacity be regulated away; but with hedge funds I show why it cannot because of “regulatory recalcitrance.” In the end a form of voluntary moral coordination, a form of “microsocial contract” instituted as an industry standard, is required relief. In a word, the solution to hedge fund opacity is ethical.
Three distinct things have been called "referential opacity," causing some confusion. A noun position in a sentence may be opaque in three different ways: (1) substitutivity of identity may fail there, (2) quantifiers prefixed to the sentence may not be able to bind variables in that position, or (3) substitutivity of identity may fail when the singular nouns in question are read as having small scope. Some connections among these three types of opacity are examined.
ailure of substitutivity of coreferential terms, one of the hallmarks of referential opacity, is standardly explained in terms of the presence of an expression (such as a verb of propositional attitude, a modal adverb or quotation marks) with opacity-inducing properties. It is thus assumed that any term in a complex expression for which substitutivity fails will be within the scope of an expression of one of these types, and that where there is an expression of one of these types there will be failure of substitutivity for terms within its scope. I shall discuss a series of examples that have been thought to challenge this explanation by exhibiting failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms for positions not within the scope of any of the standard opacity-inducing expressions. If these examples are genuine, then the usual explanations of opacity are either incomplete – because there are sources of opacity other than those standardly identified, or completely mistaken – because the standardly identified expressions are not causes of opacity. I will argue, however, that the examples only exhibit failure of substitutivity of non-coreferential terms, and, hence, do not present a challenge to standard explanations of opacity.
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