Propositional attitudes and self-reference
Philosophia 4 (April-July):271-295 (1974)
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| Keywords | Attitude Epistemology Intentionality Opacity Phenomenalism Proposition Self-reference Castaneda, H Hintikka, J Quine | |||||||||
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