Economics and the Philosophy of Science
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (1991)
Economists and other social scientists in this century have often supported economic arguments by referring to positions taken by philosophers of science. This important new book looks at the reliability of this practice and, in the process, provides economists, social scientists, and historians with the necessary background to discuss methodological matters with authority. Redman first presents an accurate, critical, yet neutral survey of the modern philosophy of science from the Vienna Circle to the present, focusing particularly on logical positivism, sociological explanations of science (Polanyi, Fleck, Kuhn), the Popper family, and the history of science. She then deals with economic methodology in the twentieth century, looking at a wide range of methodological positions, especially those supported by positions from the philosophy of science. She considers the myth of the feasibility of falsification in economics and, within the context of its significance for economics, discusses the interpretation of Kuhn's philosophy of science as consensus and the danger such a view represents to science. Appendices review the history of the is-ought dispute and list economists whose first works deal with methodological topics. Comprehensive, readable, and accessible to those with little background knowledge, Redman's book will appeal to a wide range of social scientists and philosophers of science.
|Keywords||Economics Philosophy Science Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$33.35 new (58% off) $78.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||HB71.R35 1991|
|ISBN(s)||0195064127 0195082745 9780195082746|
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Citations of this work BETA
Wenceslao J. González (1996). On the Theoretical Basis of Prediction in Economics. Journal of Social Philosophy 27 (3):201-228.
Don Ross & Chantale LaCasse (1995). Towards a New Philosophy of Positive Economics. Dialogue 34 (03):467-.
Heather M. Anderson (1999). Explanations of an Empirical Puzzle: What Can Be Learnt From a Test of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis? Journal of Economic Methodology 6 (1):31-59.
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