Making Hegel's inferentialism explicit
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Making It Explicit, Robert Brandom has suggested an "inferentialist" alternative to the dominant "representationalist" paradigm within modern philosophy, an alternative based upon a form of pragmatism that he describes as both rationalist and linguistic.1 Representationalists typically think of awareness in terms of mental contents which somehow represent or picture worldly things, events, or states of affairs. Linguistic, rationalist pragmatists, in contrast, shift the focus from conscious experience to human linguistic practices, and specifically to the norms of rationality implicit within these practices — a shift from sentience to sapience — and approach the meanings of our linguistic claims entirely in terms of the normative inferential relations between them.
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