Replies to Deranty, Ikaheimo, Lumsden and Bowden

Parrhesia 11:94–102 (2011)
As Jean-Philippe suggests in his sketch of my account of Hegel’s concept of recognition, Hegel doesn’t think of self-reflection as basically achieved by “stepping back” and viewing one’s ideas from a type of metaperspective. Rather, self-consciousness comes primarily via engagement with another, differently located subject. (If I had a badge slogan for this, it might read “Other, not Meta”.) While at a theoretical level I’ve held to a dialogical model of philosophizing for a considerable time, it is in contexts such as these that one gets a deeper sense of just how dependent on dialogical engagement any thinking actually is. There is too much in what my four interlocutors have said to respond adequately here to all points, but I’ll try to pick up on what strike me as important issues. I’ll reply to each in turn, but each reply will address issues that overflow the boundaries between separating them
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Simon Lumsden (2000). A Subject for Hegel's Logic. International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):85-99.
R. Jay Wallace (2002). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):707–727.

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