A new argument for skepticism

Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104 (2009)
The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.
Keywords Knowledge  Skepticism  Externalism  Gettier problem
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DOI 10.2307/27734354
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Baron Reed (2012). Fallibilism. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.

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