David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):186–197 (2006)
Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subject's doubts about her cognitive faculties. But, he argues, subjects don't have such doubts, so epistemically circular beliefs are rarely called upon to play this role. Second, following Thomas Reid, Bergmann argues that we have noninferential, though epistemically circular, knowledge that our faculties are reliable. I argue, however, that Bergmann's view is undermined by doubts a subject should have and that there is no plausible explanation for how we can have noninferential knowledge that our faculties are reliable
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Bondy & Dustin Olson (2015). Getting Off the Wheel. Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):620-637.
Michael Lynch (2013). Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362.
Jochen Briesen (2013). Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.
Jennifer Lackey (2006). Knowing From Testimony. Philosophy Compass 1 (5):432–448.
Jennifer Lackey (2014). Socially Extended Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):282-298.
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