David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 148 (2):303 - 308 (2006)
One of the main strands of the Cartesian tradition is the view that the mental realm is cognitively accessible to us in a special way: whenever one is in a mental state of a certain sort, one can know it just by considering the matter. In that sense, the mental realm is thought to be a cognitive home for us, and the mental states it comprises are luminous. Recently, however, Timothy Williamson has argued that we are cognitively homeless: no mental state is in fact luminous. But his argument depends on an excessively strong account of luminosity. I formulate a weaker conception of luminosity that is unaffected by Williamson’s argument and yet is substantial enough to satisfy those who wish to retain this part of the Cartesian tradition.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (1996). Cognitive Homelessness. Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):554-573.
Citations of this work BETA
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Richard Fumerton (2009). Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):67 - 76.
Similar books and articles
Jennifer Nagel (2013). Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
Patrick Greenough (2012). Discrimination and Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
Brian Weatherson (2004). Luminous Margins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):373 – 383.
Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
Baron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Graham Haydon (1995). Thick or Thin? The Cognitive Content of Moral Education in a Plural Democracy. Journal of Moral Education 24 (1):53-64.
Selim Berker (2008). Luminosity Regained. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (2):1-22.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #80,232 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #118,705 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?