The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614 (2012)
Abstract
In this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue or else strengthens the otherwise weak motive of moral sentiment
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References found in this work BETA
Kate Abramson (2001). Sympathy and the Project of Hume's Second Enquiry. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (1):45-80.
Kate Abramson (2002). Two Portraits of the Humean Moral Agent. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):301–334.

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