Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614 (2012)
|Abstract||In this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue or else strengthens the otherwise weak motive of moral sentiment|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Don Garrett (2007). The First Motive to Justice: Hume's Circle Argument Squared. Hume Studies 33 (2):257-288.
Rico Vitz (2004). Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (3):261-275.
Nancy Schauber (2009). Complexities of Character. Hume Studies 35 (1/2):29-55.
Jonas Olson (2011). Projectivism and Error in Hume's Ethics. Hume Studies 37 (1):19-42.
Glen Pettigrove (2012). Meekness and 'Moral' Anger. Ethics 122 (2):341-370.
V. Hope (1989). Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith. Oxford University Press.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2006). Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics. Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
Paul Russell (1995). Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Kate Abramson (2001). Sympathy and the Project of Hume's Second Enquiry. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (1):45-80.
James Fieser (1989). Is Hume a Moral Skeptic? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):89-105.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2008). Reason, Morality, and Hume's "Active Principles&Quot;: Comments on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Hume Studies 34 (2):267-276.
John Corvino (2008). Hume and the Second-Quality Analogy. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (2):157-173.
James Brian Coleman (2012). Hume and the Enthusiasm Puzzle. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):221-235.
Added to index2012-10-02
Total downloads3 ( #213,250 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?