David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 22 (1-4):189 – 219 (1979)
An argument is examined and defended for extending basic moral rights to animals which assumes that humans, including infants and the severely mentally enfeebled, have such rights. It is claimed that this argument proceeds on two fronts, one critical, where proposed criteria of right-possession are rejected, the other constructive, where proposed criteria are examined with a view to determining the most reasonable one. This form of argument is defended against the charge that it is self-defeating, various candidates for the title, 'most reasonable criterion of right-possession', are critically examined, and it is argued that this criterion is to be found in the notion of inherent value: What underlies the ascription of rights to any given x is that x has value logically independently of anyone's valuing x; thus, to treat x as if x had value only if or as it served one's interests, etc., is to violate x 's rights. It is argued that many animals, owing to their being subjects of a life that is more or less valuable for them logically independently of the interests of others, can satisfy this criterion and therefore have certain basic moral rights, if humans, including the severely mentally enfeebled, do. Finally, the question, What basic moral rights do animals have? is explored.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Peter Singer (ed.) (1990). Animal Liberation. Avon Books.
Tom Regan & Peter Singer (eds.) (1989). Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Cambridge University Press.
Tom Regan (1975). The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):181 - 214.
Jan Narveson (1977). Animal Rights. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):161 - 178.
Tom L. Beauchamp & Tom Regan (eds.) (1980). Matters of Life and Death. Temple University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Daniel A. Dombrowski (2006). Is the Argument From Marginal Cases Obtuse? Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (2):223–232.
Daniel A. Dombrowski (2012). The Face of Suffering The Faces of Intellectual Disability: Philosophical Reflections Carlson Licia Indiana University Press Bloomington. Journal of Animal Ethics 2 (2):205-211.
Arne Naess (1979). Self-Realization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep, and Wolves. Inquiry 22 (1-4):231 – 241.
Similar books and articles
Tom Regan (1988). The Question is Not, "Can They Talk?". Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13 (2):213-221.
Mark Rowlands (1998). Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence. St. Martin's Press.
Tom Regan (1997). The Rights of Humans and Other Animals. Ethics and Behavior 7 (2):103 – 111.
Karl Schudt (2003). Are Animal Rights Inimical to Human Dignity? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 77:189-203.
David DeGrazia (2002). Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
Aaron Simmons (2007). A Critique of Mary Anne Warren's Weak Animal Rights View. Environmental Ethics 29 (3):267-278.
Tom L. Beauchamp (1997). Opposing Views on Animal Experimentation: Do Animals Have Rights? Ethics and Behavior 7 (2):113 – 121.
Tom Regan (1980). Animal Rights, Human Wrongs. Environmental Ethics 2 (2):99-120.
Mark Rowlands (2009). Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan.
H. J. McCloskey (1979). Moral Rights and Animals. Inquiry 22 (1-4):23 – 54.
Added to index2009-03-05
Total downloads34 ( #118,558 of 1,907,527 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #197,471 of 1,907,527 )
How can I increase my downloads?