Natural theology and epistemic justification

Heythrop Journal 51 (6):1017-1022 (2010)
Abstract
First it is argued that the linkage of natural theology to epistemology is invalid historically, epistemologically and metaphysically. Second it is argued that knowledge claims about the ultimate cause of everything should be evaluated not in terms of justified true belief but in terms of the intellectual virtue of wisdom
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References found in this work BETA
Heather Battaly (2008). Virtue Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.
Lorraine Code (1987). Epistemic Responsibility. Published for Brown University Press by University Press of New England.

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