David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):659 - 677 (2011)
A number of philosophers have argued that psychiatric delusions threaten Donald Davidson's rationalist account of intentional agency. I argue that a careful look at both Davidson's account and psychiatric delusions shows that, in fact, the two are perfectly compatible. Indeed, a Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions proves remarkably illuminating
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References found in this work BETA
G. Berrios (1991). Delusions as 'Wrong Beliefs': A Conceptual History. British Journal of Psychiatry 159:6-13.
Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the Background of Rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
J. Campbell (2009). What Does Rationality Have to Do with Psychological Causation? Propositional Attitudes as Mechanisms and as Control Variables. In Matthew Broome Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oup Oxford. 137--149.
Donald Davidson (1982). Rational Animals. Dialectica 36 (4):317-28.
Simon J. Evnine (1989). Understanding Madness? Ratio 2 (1):1-18.
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