A Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions

Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):659 - 677 (2011)
A number of philosophers have argued that psychiatric delusions threaten Donald Davidson's rationalist account of intentional agency. I argue that a careful look at both Davidson's account and psychiatric delusions shows that, in fact, the two are perfectly compatible. Indeed, a Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions proves remarkably illuminating
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.562642
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Robert Klee (2004). Why Some Delusions Are Necessarily Inexplicable Beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):25-34.

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