Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):20-40 (2009)
|Abstract||All univocal analyses of causation face counterexamples. An attractive response to this situation is to become a pluralist about causal relationships. "Causal pluralism" is itself, however, a pluralistic notion. In this article, I argue in favor of pluralism about concepts of cause in the social sciences. The article will show that evidence for, inference from, and the purpose of causal claims are very closely linked. Key Words: causation • pluralism • evidence • methodology.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines (forthcoming). Coherence and Confirmation Through Causation. Mind.
Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe (2009). Cause and Norm. Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Alex Broadbent (2011). Inferring Causation in Epidemiology: Mechanisms, Black Boxes, and Contrasts. In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press.
Erik Weber (2007). Social Mechanisms, Causal Inference, and the Policy Relevance of Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (3):348-359.
S. Crasnow (2011). Evidence for Use: Causal Pluralism and the Role of Case Studies in Political Science Research. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):26-49.
Erik Weber (2009). How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):277-295.
Federica Russo (2006). The Rationale of Variation in Methodological and Evidential Pluralism. Philosophica 77.
Daniel Steel (2004). Social Mechanisms and Causal Inference. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):55-78.
Frederick S. Ellett & David P. Ericson (1983). The Logic of Causal Methods in Social Science. Synthese 57 (1):67-82.
Frederick S. Ellett Jr & David P. Ericson (1983). The Logic of Causal Methods in Social Science. Synthese 57 (1):67 - 82.
Added to index2009-02-07
Total downloads62 ( #15,090 of 548,999 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,729 of 548,999 )
How can I increase my downloads?