Causation in the social sciences: Evidence, inference, and purpose

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):20-40 (2009)
All univocal analyses of causation face counterexamples. An attractive response to this situation is to become a pluralist about causal relationships. "Causal pluralism" is itself, however, a pluralistic notion. In this article, I argue in favor of pluralism about concepts of cause in the social sciences. The article will show that evidence for, inference from, and the purpose of causal claims are very closely linked. Key Words: causation • pluralism • evidence • methodology.
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DOI 10.1177/0048393108328150
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Julian Reiss (2012). Causation in the Sciences: An Inferentialist Account. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):769-777.
Federica Russo (2014). What Invariance Is and How to Test for It. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):157-183.

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