Counterfactuals, thought experiments, and singular causal analysis in history

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):712-723 (2009)
Thought experiments are ubiquitous in science and especially prominent in domains in which experimental and observational evidence is scarce. One such domain is the causal analysis of singular events in history. A long‐standing tradition that goes back to Max Weber addresses the issue by means of ‘what‐if’ counterfactuals. In this paper I give a descriptive account of this widely used method and argue that historians following it examine difference makers rather than causes in the philosopher’s sense. While difference making is neither necessary nor sufficient for causation, to establish difference makers is more consistent with the historians’ more ultimate purposes. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands; e‐mail:
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DOI 10.1086/605826
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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Julian Reiss (2013). Contextualising Causation Part II. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1076-1090.

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