David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 76 (5):712-723 (2009)
Thought experiments are ubiquitous in science and especially prominent in domains in which experimental and observational evidence is scarce. One such domain is the causal analysis of singular events in history. A long‐standing tradition that goes back to Max Weber addresses the issue by means of ‘what‐if’ counterfactuals. In this paper I give a descriptive account of this widely used method and argue that historians following it examine difference makers rather than causes in the philosopher’s sense. While difference making is neither necessary nor sufficient for causation, to establish difference makers is more consistent with the historians’ more ultimate purposes. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands; e‐mail: email@example.com.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Julian Reiss (2013). Contextualising Causation Part II. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1076-1090.
Similar books and articles
Brian Ellis (2000). Causal Laws and Singular Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):329-351.
Peter Menzies, Counterfactual Theories of Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
S. Barker (2003). A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
James Woodward (2004). Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):41 – 72.
Max Kistler (2010). Mechanisms and Downward Causation. Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):595-609.
Jens Harbecke (2011). Mind in a Humean World. Metaphysica 12 (2):213-229.
Phil Dowe (2009). Would‐Cause Semantics. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):701-711.
Tim De Mey (2006). Imagination's Grip on Science. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):222-239.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads93 ( #12,636 of 1,101,125 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #44,290 of 1,101,125 )
How can I increase my downloads?