Did Kuhn kill logical empiricism?

Philosophy of Science 58 (2):264-277 (1991)
Abstract
In the light of two unpublished letters from Carnap to Kuhn, this essay examines the relationship between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Carnap's philosophical views. Contrary to the common wisdom that Kuhn's book refuted logical empiricism, it argues that Carnap's views of revolutionary scientific change are rather similar to those detailed by Kuhn. This serves both to explain Carnap's appreciation of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and to suggest that logical empiricism, insofar as that program rested on Carnap's shoulders, was not substantially upstaged by Kuhn's book
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John Preston (2004). Bird, Kuhn, and Positivism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (2):327-335.

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