Evidentialism and the Numbers Game
Theoria 73 (4):304-316 (2007)
| Abstract | This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evidentialism. Evidentialism is the highly intuitive view that the only normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons. I shall argue that in certain circumstances, evidentialism is unable to generate the correct reasons for belief; these reasons can only be provided by other kinds of epistemic reasons apart from evidential ones. I am not arguing that reasons in ordinary cases for belief are non-evidential, but that evidentialism is too narrow an account of normative reasons for belief to serve as a complete theory of epistemic reasons. | |||||||||
| Keywords | evidentialism reasons rationality epistemology | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesAndrew Reisner (2009). The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
Anthony Robert Booth (2008). A New Argument for Pragmatism? Philosophia 36 (2):227-231.
Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Leaps of Knowledge. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. OUP.
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2008). Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism? Dialectica 62 (4):541-547.
Allen Wood (2008). The Duty to Believe According to the Evidence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):7 - 24.
Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action. In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms.
Michael J. Shaffer (2013). Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-Contravening Commitments. American Philosophical Quarterly 50:73-82.
Inga Nayding (2011). Conceptual Evidentialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.
Andrew Reisner (2008). Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.
Jason Baehr (2009). Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):545-567.
T. Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
Scott F. Aikin (2006). Modest Evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343.
Anthony Robert Booth (2007). The Two Faces of Evidentialism. Erkenntnis 67 (3):401 - 417.
Paul K. Moser (1990). Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-09-16Total downloads55 ( #18,340 of 549,699 )Recent downloads (6 months)24 ( #2,178 of 549,699 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
