Evidentialism and the Numbers Game

Theoria 73 (4):304-316 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper I introduce an objection to normative evidentialism about reasons for belief. The objection arises from difficulties that evidentialism has with explaining our reasons for belief in unstable belief contexts with a single fixed point. I consider what other kinds of reasons for belief are relevant in such cases.
Keywords evidentialism  reasons  rationality  epistemology
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2007.tb01210.x
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References found in this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

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Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
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Paul K. Moser (1990). Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.

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