Philosophy of Science 62 (1):60-69 (1995)
|Abstract||As Laudan and Fine show, and Boyd concedes, the attempt to infer the truth of scientific realism from the fact that it putatively provides the best explanation of the instrumental success of science is circular, since what is to be shown is precisely the legitimacy of such abductive inferences. Hacking's "experimental argument for scientific realism about entities" is one of the few arguments for scientific realism that purports to avoid this circularity. We argue that Hacking's argument is as dependent on inference to the best explanation (IBE), and therefore as weak, as the other realist arguments|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ian Hacking (1989). Extragalactic Reality: The Case of Gravitational Lensing. Philosophy of Science 56 (4):555-581.
Jutta Rockmann (1998). Gravitational Lensing and Hacking's Extragalactic Irreality. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (2):151 – 164.
Mohamed Elsamahi (1994). Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism? In David & Richard Hull & Burian (ed.), PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.
Michelle Sandell (2010). Astronomy and Experimentation. Techné 14 (3):252-269.
Steve Clarke (2001). Defensible Territory for Entity Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):701-722.
Alan G. Gross (1990). Reinventing Certainty: The Significance of Ian Hacking's Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:421 - 431.
David Stump (1988). The Role of Skill in Experimentation: Reading Ludwik Fleck's Study of the Wasserman Reaction as an Example of Ian Hacking's Experimental Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:302 - 308.
Valeriano Iranzo (2008). Reliabilism and the Abductive Defence of Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (1):115 - 120.
Robert G. Hudson (2000). Perceiving Empirical Objects Directly. Erkenntnis 52 (3):357-371.
Michela Massimi (2004). Non‐Defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why We Are Justified to Believe in Colored Quarks. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):36-60.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads63 ( #17,811 of 722,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)46 ( #1,458 of 722,863 )
How can I increase my downloads?