David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 62 (1):60-69 (1995)
As Laudan and Fine show, and Boyd concedes, the attempt to infer the truth of scientific realism from the fact that it putatively provides the best explanation of the instrumental success of science is circular, since what is to be shown is precisely the legitimacy of such abductive inferences. Hacking's "experimental argument for scientific realism about entities" is one of the few arguments for scientific realism that purports to avoid this circularity. We argue that Hacking's argument is as dependent on inference to the best explanation (IBE), and therefore as weak, as the other realist arguments
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Pierson & Richard Reiner (2008). Explanatory Warrant for Scientific Realism. Synthese 161 (2):271 - 282.
Similar books and articles
Ian Hacking (1989). Extragalactic Reality: The Case of Gravitational Lensing. Philosophy of Science 56 (4):555-581.
Robert G. Hudson (2000). Perceiving Empirical Objects Directly. Erkenntnis 52 (3):357-371.
Valeriano Iranzo (2008). Reliabilism and the Abductive Defence of Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (1):115 - 120.
David Stump (1988). The Role of Skill in Experimentation: Reading Ludwik Fleck's Study of the Wasserman Reaction as an Example of Ian Hacking's Experimental Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:302 - 308.
Alan G. Gross (1990). Reinventing Certainty: The Significance of Ian Hacking's Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:421 - 431.
Steve Clarke (2001). Defensible Territory for Entity Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):701-722.
Michelle Sandell (2010). Astronomy and Experimentation. Techne 14 (3):252-269.
Mohamed Elsamahi (1994). Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism? In David & Richard Hull & Burian (ed.), PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. 173 - 180.
Jutta Rockmann (1998). Gravitational Lensing and Hacking's Extragalactic Irreality. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (2):151 – 164.
Michela Massimi (2004). Non‐Defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why We Are Justified to Believe in Colored Quarks. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):36-60.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads156 ( #6,284 of 1,410,108 )
Recent downloads (6 months)37 ( #4,590 of 1,410,108 )
How can I increase my downloads?