Idealization and the aims of economics: Three cheers for instrumentalism

Economics and Philosophy 28 (3):363-383 (2012)
Abstract
This paper aims (a) to provide characterizations of realism and instrumentalism that are philosophically interesting and applicable to economics; and (b) to defend instrumentalism against realism as a methodological stance in economics. Starting point is the observation that , which, or so I argue, is difficult to square with the realist's aim of truth, even if the latter is understood as or . The three cheers in favour of instrumentalism are: (1) Once we have usefulness, truth is redundant. (2) There is something disturbing about causal structure. (3) It's better to do what one can than to chase rainbows
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,404
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Julian Reiss (2013). The Explanation Paradox Redux. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (3):280 - 292.
Similar books and articles
Elliott Sober (2001). Instrumentalism Revisited. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001 (91):3 - 39.
Mark LeBar (2004). Ends. Social Theory and Practice 30 (4):507-533.
David Papineau (1986). The Paradox of Instrumentalism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:269 - 276.
Robin Findlay Hendry (2001). Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S25-.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-11-29

Total downloads

8 ( #172,935 of 1,102,981 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #62,029 of 1,102,981 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.